“Beyond Philosophy”
Beyond Philosophy
I. Introduction:
Philosophy is the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence. With the increasing popularity of rational discourse, many people began to elucidate their unique philosophies to digest the complex realities around them. In the pursuit of truthful knowledge, philosophers use vigorous methods to verify their claims on abstract topics. Nonetheless, philosophy is not an experimental science. Rather, it is a close enmesh of arguable claims supported by multi-interpretable evidence. Therefore, it is paramount to understand that philosophical ideas could be deeply personal and perspective-dependent, thus creating a diverse range of conclusions, to approach such ideas with controlled usefulness. Yet, there seems to be a crucial meta-knowledge that every philosopher must understand, the transcendental precedence of will over mere philosophy. In this essay, the writer will reveal the fundamentals of will that underlie the usefulness of knowledge.
II. Blinded by “Truth”
In Nietzsche’s book “Beyond Good and Evil”, Nietzsche states that the so-called philosophers, by his time, had written no more than “the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir" in their philosophical arguments (Nietzsche). Though such a claim sounds extremely radical, it is worth noting his point that some philosophers, whether inadvertently or not, include their biases, desires, and personal experiences in their philosophical reflection, conflating them with truths. Such inevitably carefree adoption of subjective interpretation could result in a philosophical judgment where the definition cannot be understood without accepting the subjectivity that the philosopher possesses. For example, Confucian philosopher Xunzi explained that human nature is evil because “a person is born with feelings of envy and hate” (Xunzi). Under his observation, his subjectivity influenced his eventual conclusion that the newborn’s craving for worldly needs demonstrated that human nature is fundamentally evil since newborns are purely subjected to innate behaviors. While this claim sounds reasonable, to some, it may be more reasonable to conclude that newborns are an incomplete picture of what humans ultimately are, since no human being stays in infancy, thus making the previous explanation not applicable to all range of human beings, as in one example. Ultimately, such fundamental discrepancy in subjectivity could cause there to be no single absolute rational justification that could decide the morality of a newborn’s behavior.
Despite observing the same phenomenon, the opposing conclusions could be both valid. Meaning, that the decisive difference between the two philosophers is the subjectivity that manifested from the characteristics of the philosophers themselves, not directly from the given set of conditions. In psychology, such a difference in affinity to certain reactions is called valence, “in certain theories of motivation, the anticipated satisfaction of attaining a particular goal or outcome” (APA). For example, some people might have a positive valence toward the idea of maximum utility, making them more likely to be utilitarian, or some people might have a negative valence toward the idea of frequent, outward human interaction, making them more likely to be introverted. Although some grounds are more universally equalized, such as having positive valence toward activities like helping others, some subtleness in subjectivity for some arguments might be great enough to sway the philosophers into opposing yet valid halves. Therefore, some people may have a greater affinity to one presupposition while some to the other as to any argument, since there is no one vertical logical measurement to conclude which subjective affinity is more rational other than the unknown causes that resulted in the respective choices. From here, it can be understood that in the mind of a philosopher, one’s affinity toward certain incomparable presuppositions could greatly impact the rationality of an argument.
III. Philosophy as a Psychological Phenomenon
If so, although the ideas of philosophy could remain solid as a discipline, the minds of philosophers who select and evaluate the importance and rationality of truth may be fallible to subjectivity. This observation runs parallel to the twentieth-century philosopher Schopenhauer, who claimed that will, often irrational and blind, is “the thing-in-itself, the fundamental reality of the world” (Schopenhauer). Even later, contemporary philosophers like Nietzsche asserted that the most fundamental, indivisible form of reality is the will to power, “the primitive form of effect, that all other effects are only developments of it” (Nietzsche). This suggests that because biases, desires, and personal experiences could subsequently affect which philosophical position to take, as philosophers who manifest their existence through philosophical ideas, not only their actions but the philosophical ideas themselves may be immediately subject to their pure, distinctive will. Of course, it is true that when philosophy mixes with precise, objective language such as in analytical philosophy, the impact of subjective will may dawn shallow in concluding argument. However, for fields of philosophy that deal with value systems, such as virtues ethics, or eudaimonia, the impact of subjectivity may be profound, as the philosophers’ past beliefs and experiences might unconsciously shape their thought process. Take Schopenhauer’s doubtful philosophy toward existence and coherent predisposition as an example. Although Schopenhauer’s pessimism and anxiety toward life are attributed to his existential view, it might have also been affected by having a tumultuous relationship with his mother, avoiding social engagements to isolate himself intently on his philosophical pursuits, and being denied his academic achievements in his lifetime (Janaway). In modern psychology that deals with the theory of valence, such coherence might be seen as the consequence of both poor overall relationship quality and excessive self-awareness, which correlate with depression-related symptoms (Teo, et al.) (Goverover, et al.). Furthermore, take Nietzsche’s life as an example, where his vitriolic, secluded nature and poor health, especially in the latter dysfunctional part of his life, might have contributed to the concept of Übermensch, to manifest the ultimate spirit of human evolution in face of his socially dire situation (Kaufmann). As such, it is reasonable to believe that there exists a non-negligible connection between the philosopher’s life personal life and their subjective theory.
However, it remains crucial to not hastily conclude that the environment is all that passively shapes a philosopher’s will, because as the indivisible whim of will stands as truth, so does the power of will to make decisions voluntarily independent from the environment. Such independence and immediacy of subjective will hold power because although the environment around the decision-maker can affect the direction of the decision being made, ultimately the subjectivity that will be displayed by the decision-maker may be malleable enough as a shift of perspective through cognitive flexibility. (Meleady, et al.) For example, simple cognitive tools such as meditation, first-hand experience, priming, shift of perspective, or data skills such as randomization or source can prevent philosophers from the danger of bias and narrowness. This way, philosophers could somewhat overcome the influence of their subjective affinity toward certain ideas and broaden the horizon of their abstraction. Nonetheless, if such philosophical and psychological views are true, then it becomes much more important to investigate the minds of philosophers rather than the conclusions that they derive.
IV. Conclusion
Due to the subjectivity of will, exploring the subjectivity of philosophers might be just as important as exploring the appropriate reasonings behind their argument. This realization expands the discipline of philosophy into meta-realization through understanding how the psychology of the thinkers themselves could affect affinity toward certain arguments over others. Rather than concluding that subjectivity destabilizes the reliability of philosophical ideas, it is more productive to process that utilizing and considering such subjective differences would level up the convincing or rationalizing justification to an even more detailed level. This way, philosophers would be able to gain a new dimension when analyzing works of philosophy, on a personal and subjective level of the philosophers. This realization can also motivate philosophers to take further investigate grounds in multiple directions to try to break away from their own biases and demand further explanations and justifications.
References
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Janaway, Christopher, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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Meleady, R., Crisp, R. J., Dhont, K., Hopthrow, T., & Turner, R. N. (2020). Intergroup contact, social dominance orientation, and the deprovincialization of ingroup attitudes. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 46, 101580.
Teo, Alan R et al. “Social relationships and depression: ten-year follow-up from a nationally representative study.” PloS one vol. 8,4 e62396. 30 Apr. 2013, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062396
Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Beyond Good and Evil." Translated by Walter Kaufmann, Vintage Books, 1989, p. 6.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation. Translated by E.F.J. Payne, vol. 1, Dover Publications, 1966.
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